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The Need for “Supreme” Clarity:
Clothing, Copyright, and Conceptual
Separability
Jacqueline Lefebvre*
For the first time in history, the U.S. Supreme Court will address
copyright protection in the context of apparel in the case Star Athletica,
LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. This case tackles arguably the most vexing, unresolved question in copyright law: How to determine whether
artistic features of a useful article—such as a garment or piece of furniture—are conceptually separable from the article and thus protectable.
Indeed, this case comes more than sixty years after Mazer v. Stein, the
Supreme Court’s first and, until this date, only decision in this area. A
lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court and Congress in determining whether the artistic and utilitarian aspects of useful articles are
conceptually separable, has resulted in a multitude of conflicting and
effectively unreliable approaches by courts and scholars in an attempt to
establish a standard. Given this reality, the current state of conceptual
separability demands clarity and reform.
This Note proposes a two-part conceptual separability test, which
asks: (1) what are the claimed design elements of the article; and (2) can
those design elements be identified separately from, and exist independently of, the utilitarian features of the article? This Note’s proposed
test is an effective and appropriate approach for determining when a feature of a useful article is protectable under the Copyright Act for several
reasons: focusing the conceptual separability inquiry on the article’s design elements as opposed to its utilitarian features avoids inconsistent
*

Senior Writing and Research Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal, Volume XXVII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School
of Law, 2017; B.A., Business Economics and French, University of California, Santa
Barbara, 2012. I would like to thank Professor Susan Scafidi for introducing me to this
topic and the IPLJ Editorial Board and Staff for their efforts throughout the editorial
process.

143

144

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:143

results; the two-part inquiry draws from language of the Copyright Office, which in turn reflects agreement between the legislative and judicial
branches; the ordinary, reasonable observer standard is consistent with
other aspects of copyright law; and the proposed test is practical in its
application.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 145
I. THE
DEVELOPMENT
OF
COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR USEFUL ARTICLES ................... 149
A. Establishing Copyright Law for Useful Articles ......... 149
B. Mazer v. Stein ........................................................ 150
C. Codifying the Current Separability Standard ........... 151
II. THE
INADEQUACIES
OF
CONCEPTUAL
SEPARABILITY AS CURRENTLY APPLIED ............... 154
A. Existing Conceptual Separability Tests ..................... 155
1. Copyright Office’s Approach .......................... 155
2. Primary-Subsidiary Approach ......................... 156
3. Objectively Necessary Approach .................... 156
4. Ordinary-Observer Approach.......................... 157
5. Design-Process Approach ............................... 158
6. Stand-Alone Approach .................................... 159
7. Likelihood-of-Marketability Approach............ 160
8. Patry’s Approach............................................. 161
9. Subjective-Objective Approach ....................... 161
10. Sixth Circuit’s “Hybrid” Approach ............... 162
B. Mounting Inadequacies of Current Conceptual
Separability Tests .................................................... 163
C. The Need for One Uniform Application of
Conceptual Separability ........................................... 166
III. RESOLVING THE MOST VEXING PROBLEM IN
COPYRIGHT LAW ...................................................... 171
A. The Proposed Test for Conceptual Separability .......... 171
B. Advantages of the Proposed Test................................ 174
1. An Initial Consideration of Design Rather
than Utility Avoids Inconsistent Results ......... 175
2. The Proposed Test Uses Language of the
Copyright Office, Which Is Consistent with
the Legislative and Judicial Branches .............. 176

2016]

NEED FOR “SUPREME” CLARITY

145

3. The Ordinary, Reasonable Observer
Standard Is Consistent with Other Areas of
Copyright Law ................................................. 177
4. The Proposed Test Is Practical in Its
Application ...................................................... 177
CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 179

INTRODUCTION
Some say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, but fashion designers may disagree. According to industry reports, fashion is a global business worth more than $1.2 trillion, with over
$250 billion spent on fashion in the United States yearly.1 Despite
fashion’s economic and artistic contributions to our global economy, American designers are provided limited intellectual property
protection.2 Predominantly a result of emerging technologies and
lack of intellectual property protection, knockoffs and counterfeits
may be immediately and effortlessly produced at a much cheaper
price point.3 As a result of a loss in sales, market share, and good
will, unauthorized copies can effectively damage or even destroy a
designer’s career.4 Thus, intellectual property rights are an essential component in the promotion of innovation and creativity within
the fashion industry.5

1

Darrell Mottley, Intellectual Property Alert: U.S. Supreme Court Will Weigh In on Star
Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands Inc., JD SUPRA (May 3, 2016), http://
www.jdsupra.com/post/contentViewerEmbed.aspx?fid=ec9e3583-2835-4016-b62ba46a7c1dd066 [https://perma.cc/CYH3-H97L]; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
6, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016).
2
See Christiane Schuman Campbell, Protecting Fashion Designs Through IP Law,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/
protecting_fashion_designs_through_ip_law_5516.html
[https://perma.cc/UG36S63T].
3
See id.
4
See Ahlam Al Tamimi, Intellectual Property is an Enormous Asset in the Fashion
Industry, FASHION L. (July 27, 2016), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/intellectualproperty-is-an-enormous-asset-in-the-high-fashion-industry
[https://perma.cc/2RZA7SKR].
5
See id.
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There are generally three forms of intellectual property protection for fashion designers: patents, trademarks, and copyrights.6
Patents are typically difficult to obtain because they are expensive
and the process is time-consuming.7 Trademarks do not actually
protect designs, but rather protect “source identifiers” such as logos, symbols, and brand names.8 Clothing designs are traditionally
afforded limited protection under U.S. copyright law, which protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.”9 In order to meet the originality requirement, a work
must be independently created by its author, and possess at least
some minimal degree of creativity.10 Clothing designs certainly fall
within this ambit of originality, however, little protection is offered
to clothing under copyright law because copyright protection does
not extend to functional items.11 The only way for clothing to acquire copyright protection is if the clothing article’s design elements “can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”12 What
this entails has been the subject of much confusion and debate.13
In Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to review an August 2015 ruling by the Sixth Circuit
to determine whether the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking on
cheerleading uniforms are entitled to copyright protection under
federal law.14 This is the first time the Supreme Court has addressed copyright protection in the context of apparel. The case
arose from a dispute between two competing manufacturers of
6

See Campbell, supra note 2.
See Oliver Herzfeld, Protecting Fashion Designs, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/01/03/protecting-fashion-designs/
#726f85d673f8 [https://perma.cc/TLL7-K5RM].
8
See id.
9
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
10
“For example, a white [T]-shirt cannot garner copyright protection because the [T]shirt is a useful item with no separately artistic element.” Lori Levine, Jeffrey D. Wexler
& Bobby Ghajar, Protecting Fashion Through Copyrights: The Supreme Court Will Decide
Whether Cheer Uniform Designs Are Protectable, PILLSBURY L. 1 (May 11, 2016),
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/AlertMay2016IPProtecting
FashionThroughCopyrights.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK72-74VA].
11
See id.
12
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
13
See Levine et al., supra note 10.
14
Mottley, supra note 1.
7

2016]

NEED FOR “SUPREME” CLARITY

147

cheerleading uniforms, in which Varsity Brands accused Star Athletica of reproducing the copyrighted design elements of its cheerleading uniforms.15 In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the
stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking of a cheerleading uniform were eligible for copyright protection, effectively reversing
the district court’s decision.16 The district court judge, in determining that the designs themselves were not copyrightable, explained that he could not distinguish between the creative aspects
of the uniforms and the purpose of the uniforms themselves.17
Although Varsity Brands involves unusual subject matter for
the Supreme Court, the implications of this decision will resonate
far beyond cheerleading uniforms. Star Athletica, in its petition for
certiorari, argued that this case involved “the most vexing, unresolved question in copyright law: how to determine whether a feature of a useful article—such as a garment or piece of furniture—is
conceptually separable from the article and thus protectable.”18
The determination of separability19 has proven to be particularly difficult in the context of fashion, likely due to clothing possessing both functional and aesthetic attributes. Clothing serves the utilitarian function of protecting the body from natural elements, but
also contains original designs that account for purely artistic preferences.20 As illustrated by cases in the Second Circuit, a court will
first inquire whether the claimed copyrighted work is physically
15

Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2015),
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016).
16
See Bonnie Eslinger, 6th Circ. Leaves Cheerleader Uniform IP Protection in Place,
LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712215/6th-circ-leavescheerleader-uniform-ip-protection-in-place [https://perma.cc/9V7D-XW23].
17
See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *9
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015).
18
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5.
19
The determination of separability is a two-fold standard, which illustrates a
philosophical quality to copyright disputes as it often deals with questions of “essence.”
See Varsity Brands, 2014 WL 819422, at *1 (“The philosopher Plato famously discussed
the essence of physical objects as separate from their ideal. Taking the example of a tree,
we may well consider as a ‘tree’ a thing with only a few branches and fewer leaves,
because it still reflects, however poorly, the ideal we inherently know to be ‘tree.’ It
possesses tree-ness.”).
20
See Edward F. Maluf, Why Creativity Needs IP Protection, APPAREL (Oct. 13, 2015),
http://apparel.edgl.com/news/Why-Creativity-Needs-IP-Protection102742
[https://
perma.cc/9CRB-CBJT].
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separable from the utilitarian object such that it “can actually be
removed from the original item and separately sold, without adversely impacting the article’s functionality.”21 If the design elements are not physically separable, a court will undertake another
inquiry into whether the elements are “conceptually separable.”22
With no clear approach to determining whether the artistic and
utilitarian aspects of useful articles are conceptually separable,
courts and scholars have devised a number of ways to apply this
standard.23 Indeed, in Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit argued that
there are as many as nine existing conceptual separability tests, before formulating its own “hybrid” approach, adding to the already
convoluted area of law.24 Consequently, the multitude of approaches have led to inconsistent results among the courts. Thus,
by agreeing to hear the case, “the Supreme Court has the opportunity to settle the law of clothing and copyright, which currently is
anything but clear.”25
This Note focuses on the need to harmonize copyright law by
determining one uniform application of conceptual separability for
all courts and scholars to follow. Part I discusses the history of copyright law in the context of useful articles, the development of the
separability standard, and the relevant statutory language of the
Copyright Act. Part II introduces ten existing conceptual separability tests used by courts and scholars today, explains why the existing tests are inadequate, and addresses the need for one conceptual

21

See Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328–29 (2d Cir.
2005); see also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980) (providing a classic example of a copyrightable design that satisfies the physical
separateness requirement is an ornament that is affixed to a belt buckle that could also be
worn separately as a pin).
22
See Maluf, supra note 20.
23
See generally Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109
(2008).
24
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484–87 (6th Cir. 2015),
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016).
25
Press Release, Shiva Stella, Pub. Knowledge, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Star
Athletica v. Varsity Brands (May 2, 2016), https://www.publicknowledge.org/pressrelease/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-star-athletica-v-varsity-brands [https://perma.cc/
AMK9-FP3U].
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separability test. Part III proposes a new single conceptual separability test, and highlights the advantages of its application.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
USEFUL ARTICLES
Before delving into the intricacies of conceptual separability, it
is necessary to introduce some background information on copyright law. Section A reflects on the creation of copyright law for
useful articles and the powers vested in Congress through the U.S.
Constitution to create such law. Section B examines Mazer v. Stein,
the first case involving the concept of separability in copyright.
Section C discusses the current separability standard and the legislative history leading up to its codification.
A. Establishing Copyright Law for Useful Articles
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to enact laws
establishing a system of copyright in the United States.26 In particular, Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”27 Since the first federal
copyright law in 1790, which protected books, maps, and charts,
Congress has included some form of useful works of art in its scope
of protection.28 It was not until 1870, however, that protection was
extended beyond two-dimensional works of the visual arts to include, for the first time, certain three-dimensional works “intended
to be perfected and executed as a work of the fine arts.”29 After a
series of amendments, Congress eliminated the 1870 “fine arts”
requirement and broadened the scope of copyright protection to
include all “[w]orks of art; models or design for works of art” in

26

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY, http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html [https://
perma.cc/J3ZK-D6W5] (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
27
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 26.
29
See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).
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the 1909 Act.30 The broadening of copyright beyond the purely aesthetic thus set the stage for protecting designs of utilitarian works.31
B. Mazer v. Stein
In 1954, forty-five years after the enactment of the 1909 Act,
the Supreme Court made its first and, to this date, only venture
into the statutory and administrative ambit of copyright protection
for useful articles when it decided Mazer v. Stein.32 At issue in Mazer were statuettes of male and female dancing figures “intended for
use and used as bases for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets
and lamp shades attached.”33 The plaintiff, the manufacturer of the
lamps, successfully registered the statuettes (sans lamp components) with the U.S. Copyright Office as “works of art” under the
Copyright Act of 1909.34 The plaintiff sold the statuettes throughout the United States, with the majority of profits coming from
sales of the statuette in its functional lamp assembly.35 The plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant, a competing manufacturer, who
copied plaintiff’s statuettes without permission and sold copies of
the statuettes for defendant’s own lamps.36
The issue in Mazer was presented as follows: “Can statuettes
be protected . . . when the copyright applicant intended primarily
to use the statuettes in the form of lamp bases . . . ?”37 The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, concluding the statuettes
were eligible for copyright protection.38 The Court explained that
the use or intended use of the statuettes as lamp bases did not bar
or invalidate its registration as copyrightable works of art.39 In making its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the development of
the Copyright Act, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, and the
30

See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077
(repealed 1976).
31
See Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 339, 342 (1990).
32
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
33
Id. at 202.
34
See id. at 202–03.
35
See id. at 203.
36
See id.
37
Id. at 204–05.
38
See id. at 214.
39
See id. at 218.
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Copyright Office’s practices.40 The Court explained that the removal of “fine art” in the 1909 Act eliminated any “[v]erbal distinctions between purely aesthetic articles and useful works of art,”
and was intended “to include more than the traditional fine arts.”41
In determining that the statuettes qualified as “works of art,” the
Court held:
Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a
power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art. . . .
[Works of art] must be original, that is, the author’s
tangible expression of his ideas. Such expression,
whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image or conveying the meaning by modernistic
form or color, is copyrightable.42
C. Codifying the Current Separability Standard
Following the Mazer decision, the Copyright Office, at the request of Congress, evaluated the current copyright law and proposed regulations to be used for a comprehensive reform of the
1909 Copyright Act.43 In 1961, the Register of Copyrights44 issued
his recommendations:45 The Register acknowledged the holding in
Mazer, but still intended to not “extend the copyright law to industrial designs.”46 Regarding the copyrightability of useful articles,
the regulation stated: “If the sole intrinsic function of an article is
its utility, the fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped
will not qualify it as a work of art.”47 This first sentence of the reg40

See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 344.
See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 211–13.
42
Id. at 214 (citation omitted); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251–52 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
43
See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 717–18 (1983).
44
The Register of Copyrights, as the director of the Copyright Office, is responsible for
all administrative functions and duties under the Copyright Act and is authorized to
establish regulations consistent with the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
45
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 14–15 (Comm.
Print 1961).
46
Id. at 13.
47
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) (emphasis added).
41
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ulation was created entirely by the Copyright Office, raising a new
issue of determining the “sole intrinsic function” of a particular
article.48 The regulation further stated: “However if the shape of a
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture,
carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.”49 The second sentence essentially paraphrased the holding in Mazer and established what
came to be known as the separability standard.
Congress selected particular regulations suggested by the Copyright Office, including the separability standard, and codified
them in what is now known as the Copyright Act of 1976 (the
“1976 Act”).50 The 1976 Act, which grants copyright protection to
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” is the current copyright law of the United States.51 Section 102(a) of the Act affords copyright protection to categories of
“works of authorship,” including “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”52 By replacing the term “works of art” from the 1909
Act with the “pictorial, graphic, sculptural works” (“PGS”) category, Congress sought to finally end copyright’s association with
fine arts.53 Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines PGS works as “twodimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes,
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”54 The definition continues: “Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”55 The final
part of the PGS definition draws from the language of the Copyright Office regulation: The design of a useful article shall be considered a PGS work “only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 346.
§ 202.10(c) (emphasis added).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See id. § 102.
Id.
See § 101.
Id.
Id.
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identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.”56
The definition of PGS works also cross-references the definition of a “useful article.”57 It was here that Congress’s language in
the 1976 Act was a significant deviation from the Copyright Office’s recommended regulation. Congress removed the word
“sole” contained in the Copyright Office regulation, leaving section 101 of the Act to define a “useful article” as “an article having
an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”58 This omission
broadened the scope of “useful articles” from works that have exclusive utilitarian function to those that have any utilitarian function.59 In effect, this expansion in scope actually limited the number
of copyrightable works by subjecting more works to the separability
standard.60
It is common ground among courts that the language added by
the 1976 Act was intended to differentiate creative works that enjoy
protection from those elements of industrial design that do not.61
Although Congress may have had a clear goal in mind, application
of this language has presented courts with considerable difficulty.62
Indeed, as one scholar noted: “Of the many fine lines that run
through the Copyright Act, none is more troublesome than the line
between protectible pictorial, graphic and sculptural works and unprotectible [sic] utilitarian elements of industrial design.”63 Since
the Copyright Act defines neither “identified separately” nor “existing independently,”64 the Copyright Act’s legislative history is
56

Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
58
Id.
59
See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 350. Compare § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information.” (emphasis added)), with 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960)
(“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility the fact that the article is unique and
attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art.” (emphasis added)).
60
See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 350.
61
See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920–21 (7th Cir.
2004).
62
See id. at 921.
63
1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3 (3d ed. 2005).
64
§ 101.
57
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looked to for guidance. The congressional report65 explains that the
purpose behind Congress’s language was “to draw as clear a line as
possible between copyrightable works of applied art and nonprotectable works of industrial design.”66 The report emphasizes
the legislature’s intent to exclude industrial design from protection:
Although the shape of an industrial product may be
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s intention is not to offer it copyright protection
under the bill. Unless the shape of an . . . industrial
product contains some element that, physically or
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would
not be copyrighted under the bill.67
The report’s most notable reference is the potential for copyright protection of an element that can be conceptually identified as
being separable from the useful article.68 This language of conceptual separability produced a wide variety of ways to interpret the
separability standard. Consequently, the report’s attempt for clarification may have only blurred the line between copyrightable expression and non-copyrightable utilitarian designs, thus laying out
the inevitable demand for judicial analysis.
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY AS
CURRENTLY APPLIED
In his dissenting opinion in Varsity Brands, Judge McKeague
made clear that a resolution for conceptual separability was

65

Congressional reports are the designated class of publications by which
congressional committees report and make recommendations to the House or Senate as a
whole. These reports concern the findings of committee hearings or the outcome of
committee deliberations. They can contain discussions of legislative intent, a short history
of a bill, and comparisons of current and proposed law text. Specific to this Note’s
discussion, House Report No. 94-1476 addressed the general revision of the Copyright
Law, title 17 of the United States Code.
66
H.R. REP. No. 94–1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
67
Id. (emphasis added).
68
See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 351.
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needed.69 “The law in this area is a mess—and it has been for a
long time,” Judge McKeague wrote.70 “The majority takes a stab
at sorting it out, and so do I. But until we get much-needed clarification, courts will continue to struggle and the business world will
continue to be handicapped by the uncertainty of the law.”71 Accordingly, Section A introduces the existing conceptual separability
tests that are currently used by courts and scholars. Section B highlights particular conceptual separability tests that should not be
considered by the Supreme Court in Star Athletica v. Varsity
Brands. Section C addresses the conflicts which arise when courts
use multiple conceptual separability tests in their analysis.
A. Existing Conceptual Separability Tests
In Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit examined nine conceptual
separability tests that are currently used by courts and scholars. In
the end, the Sixth Circuit created a tenth test for determining conceptual separability, adding to this already crowded and confusing
territory of copyright law.
1. Copyright Office’s Approach
Under the Copyright Office’s approach to conceptual separability, the artistic features of a useful article “must be imagined
separately and independently from the useful article without destroying the basic shape of that article.”72 In other words, if the artistic features are an integral part of the overall shape or contour of
the useful article, the features are not conceptually separable because removing the features would destroy the basic shape.73 This
approach provides an objective basis for visualizing the artistic features and the useful article as separate and independent works.74
Thus, a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature satisfies [the conceptual separability] requirement only if the artistic feature and the
69

See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 496 (6th Cir. 2015)
(McKeague, J., dissenting), cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016).
70
Id. at 496–97.
71
Id. at 497.
72
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 924.2(B) (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM III].
73
See id.
74
See id.
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useful article could both exist side by side and be perceived as fully
realized, separate works—one an artistic work and the other a useful article.”75
To illustrate its analysis, the Copyright Office gives the example of a carving on the back of a chair.76 The Copyright Office explains that the carving is conceptually separable from the chair, and
thus copyrightable, “because one could imagine the carving . . . as a
drawing on a piece of paper that is entirely distinct from the overall
shape of the chair.”77 Moreover, even if the carving was removed,
the shape of the chair would remain unchanged and would still be
capable of serving its useful purpose.78
2. Primary-Subsidiary Approach
The primary-subsidiary approach79 arose out of Kieselstein-Cord
v. Accessories by Pearl80 in 1980. The case was declared to be “on
the razor’s edge of copyright law” as it involved drawing a “fine
line” under applicable copyright law to determine whether belt
buckles, a utilitarian object, could be eligible for copyright protection.81 The Second Circuit held that the primary ornamental aspect
of the buckles was conceptually separate from the belts’ subsidiary
utilitarian function.82 Thus, the primary-subsidiary approach allows PGS features to be copyrightable when the artistic features of
the design are “primary” to the “subsidiary utilitarian function.”83
3. Objectively Necessary Approach
The objectively necessary approach84 developed from Carol
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.85 in 1985. The Second Circuit
held that mannequins of partial human torsos used to display ar75

Id.
See id.
77
Id.
78
See id.
79
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016).
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632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Id. at 990.
82
See id. at 993.
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Id.
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Varsity, 799 F.3d at 484.
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ticles of clothing were not copyrightable.86 The court explained
that the mannequins were utilitarian articles that did not possess
artistic or aesthetic features that were conceptually separable from
their utilitarian dimension.87 The Second Circuit arrived at this approach by looking to the legislative history of the 1976 Act.88 Applying the principles found within the legislative history,89 the
court was persuaded by the fact that the aesthetic and artistic features of the mannequins were inseparable from the forms’ use as
utilitarian articles.90 Moreover, “to the extent the forms possess
aesthetically pleasing features, even when these features are considered in the aggregate, they cannot be conceptualized as existing
independently of their utilitarian function.”91 Put another way, the
objectively necessary approach finds that a PGS feature is conceptually separable if the artistic features of the design are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article.92
4. Ordinary-Observer Approach
The ordinary-observer approach93 stems from Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion in Carol Barnhart.94 Judge Newman explained that for a design feature to be conceptually separable, “the
article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept that is
separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.”95
Therefore, two questions are to be asked in this analysis: (1) who is
the beholder, and (2) when may a concept be considered separate?96 Judge Newman believed that “the relevant beholder must
86

See id. at 418
See id.
88
See id. at 415.
89
See id. at 418 (“The legislative history thus confirms that, while copyright protection
has increasingly been extended to cover articles having a utilitarian dimension, Congress
has explicitly refused copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design
which have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the
useful article.”).
90
See id.
91
Id.
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See id. at 419.
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Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016).
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See Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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be that most useful legal personage—the ordinary, reasonable observer.”97 This “person” is the same profile used to decide many
conceptual issues in copyright law, such as the concept of “substantial similarity.”98 Judge Newman concluded that the design
concept is separate “only when the non-utilitarian concept can be
entertained in the mind of the ordinary observer without at the
same time contemplating the utilitarian function.”99 In other
words, a PGS feature is conceptually separable if “the design
creates in the mind of the ordinary [reasonable] observer two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”100
5. Design-Process Approach
The design-process approach101 stems from Robert Denicola’s
article, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles.102 Professor Denicola argues that copyrightability “ultimately should depend on the extent to which the
work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations.”103 In the 1987 case Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade
Pacific Lumber Co., the Second Circuit found Denicola’s approach
to be the best test for conceptual separability.104 The Second Circuit, in addressing its deviation from the conceptual separability
approach used in Carol Barnhart two years prior, explained that
perhaps the difference between the majority and the dissent in
Carol Barnhart might have been resolved had they had Denicola’s
article before them.105 Thus, the Second Circuit, by adopting Denicola’s approach, held that a PGS feature is conceptually separable
97

Id.
Id. For an explanation of how the “ordinary observer” personage is used in
substantial similarity analysis, see Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271–72 (2d Cir.
2001).
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Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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See id. at 422.
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Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016).
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Robert C. Denicola is a Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska. See generally
Denicola, supra note 43.
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Id. at 741.
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See 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987).
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if the “design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences.”106
The design-process approach was revisited in the 2004 case Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., which involved a female mannequin head named “Mara.”107 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the mannequin could be conceptualized as
existing independent from its use in hair display or make-up training because it was the product of the designer’s artistic judgment.108 The designer was not constrained by any specific measurements or dimensions; indeed, there was no evidence that the
designer’s artistic judgment was constrained by functional considerations.109 Rather, the designer “had carte blanche to implement
that vision as he saw fit.”110 By contrast, this was not a situation,
such as in Carol Barnhart, in which the mannequin features were
included in the design for purely functional reasons.111 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit held that because the “Mara” mannequin was
“the product of a creative process unfettered by functional concerns,” it therefore met the requirements of conceptual separability and was eligible for copyright protection. 112
6. Stand-Alone Approach
The stand-alone approach113 stems from Judge Kanne’s dissenting opinion in Pivot Point.114 Judge Kanne proposed that when
determining the copyrightability of a PGS feature, the important
question to ask is “whether the features themselves are utilitarian
aspects of the useful article.”115 In other words, under the stand106
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372 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2004).
108
See id. at 931.
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Id. at 932.
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See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (“[I]n Carol Barnhart the distinctive features of the
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112
Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 932.
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alone approach, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature is conceptually separable if “the useful article’s functionality remain[s] intact once the copyrightable material is separated.”116 Therefore,
Mara’s features could not be copyrighted because taking away the
facial features would greatly diminish or eliminate the mannequin’s
functionality.117
7. Likelihood-of-Marketability Approach
The likelihood-of-marketability approach118 stems from the language of the leading treatise in the field, Nimmer on Copyright.119
Nimmer considers conceptual separability to exist where “there is
any substantial likelihood that, even if the article had no utilitarian
use, it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the
community simply because of its aesthetic qualities.”120 In other
words, a PGS work is considered conceptually separable from its
utilitarian counterpart if the aesthetic element would have market
value on its own.
In Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., the Fifth Circuit endorsed Nimmer’s approach as applied to garment designs only.121
The basic issue in Galiano was whether casino uniforms were copyrightable.122 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the conceptual
separability test is not precisely defined but found, however, that
the likelihood-of-marketability test was the most determinative
analysis at that time.123 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that the
designs were not marketable independently of their utilitarian function as casino uniforms.124
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Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 484.
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8. Patry’s Approach
Copyright expert William Patry’s approach, which claims
“[s]eparability need not be complex or elusive,”125 relies on the
statutory language of the Copyright Act. Accordingly, when determining whether PGS features are protectable under the Copyright Act, Patry’s approach focuses on whether the PGS features
are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article.126 Patry’s approach emphasizes the fact that the features must be capable of existing as intangible features independent
of the utilitarian aspects of the article, not the article as a whole.127
The 1976 Act redirected the focus away from “article” by using
the term “aspect” which made clear that “the protected features
need not be capable of existing apart from the article, only from its
functional aspects.”128
Put another way, Patry’s approach inquires whether the PGS
features are “dictated by the form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article.”129 If the features are dictated by the
form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article, then
the features are not capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects.130 To the contrary, if the PGS features are not dictated
by the form or function of the functional aspects, then the features
can be said to be capable of existing independently, and consequently are eligible for copyright.131
9. Subjective-Objective Approach
Under the subjective-objective approach,132 conceptual separability is determined by balancing two considerations: (1) “the degree to which the designer’s subjective process is motivated by aesthetic concerns,” and (2) “the degree to which the design of a use125

2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:146, Westlaw (database updated
Sept. 2016).
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See id.
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Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 485 (6th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016).
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ful article is objectively dictated by its utilitarian function.”133 The
first consideration requires courts to assess “the degree to which
aesthetic concerns, as opposed to functional ones, motivate the designer.”134 The second consideration focuses on whether “the design is mostly dictated by function” or “hardly dictated by function
at all.”135 If the useful article’s design is “mostly dictated by function,” then the design elements are likely not conceptually separable from the useful article, and thus ineligible for copyright protection.136 To the contrary, if the design is “hardly dictated by function at all,” then the courts will more likely consider the PGS work
to be copyrightable.137
10. Sixth Circuit’s “Hybrid” Approach
In Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit, after analyzing the nine
previous conceptual separability tests, came up with its own “hybrid” approach, grounded in the language of the Copyright Act.138
The Sixth Circuit found the best approach was to engage in a fivequestion inquiry. The court first asks: (1) “Is the design a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work?”139 If the design is a PGS work, then
the court next asks: (2) “[I]s it a design of a useful article,” and (3)
“[w]hat are the utilitarian aspects of the useful article?”140 Here,
the court gave an example of a chair, explaining that the chair is a
useful article because it serves the utilitarian purpose of providing a
place for a person to sit.141 Once the court has identified permissible utilitarian aspects, the court asks two final questions: (4) “Can
the viewer of the design identify ‘pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features’ ‘separately from… the utilitarian aspects of the useful
article?’”142 And if so, the court asks: (5) “Can ‘the pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features’ [identified in response to question
133

Keyes, supra note 23, at 141.
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four] ‘exist independently of the utilitarian aspects’ [identified in
response to question three]?”143
The Sixth Circuit’s test is viewed as a hybrid approach because
the court borrowed aspects from several other existing tests. For
example, the objectively necessary approach is used to answer the
fifth question: If the PGS features of the useful article are “not…
required by utilitarian functions” or are “wholly unnecessary to
performance of the utilitarian function,” then the PGS features are
not dictated by the function of the useful article, and therefore can
exist independently.144 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit took the design-process approach into consideration because the designer’s
testimony may offer guidance as to which components of the design are necessary to the functionality of the useful article.145 The
court also found the Copyright Office’s approach to be helpful in
its analysis: Conceptual separability exists if “the artistic feature
[of the design] and the useful article could both exist side by side
and be perceived as fully realized, separate works—one an artistic
work and the other a useful article.”146 In other words, if the observer can imagine the PGS features of a useful article as an artistic
work, then those features are separately identifiable and can exist
independently.
B. Mounting Inadequacies of Current Conceptual Separability Tests
The existing conceptual separability tests differ in the article at
issue and the method by which courts and scholars evaluate the
article’s eligibility for copyright protection.147 As such, depending
on the subject at issue, there are varying advantages and disadvantages to the existing approaches. However, the overall status is
multiple conflicting tests employed by the courts with no clear definition of the conceptual separability standard.148 Not only do several of these tests clash with each other, but some tests lack suffi143
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cient support within their own analysis. Since this Note will propose a new, single conceptual separability test as the most effective,149 it is not necessary to address and weigh the flaws of each
individual conceptual separability test. However, there are three
tests—the primary-subsidiary approach, the design-process approach, and the likelihood-of-marketability approach—which are
particularly weak in their comprehension and application. Thus,
the Supreme Court should avoid these tests in particular when
considering the appropriate conceptual separability standard.
To begin, the problem with the primary-subsidiary approach is
that it offers little guidance to the trier of fact as to what is being
measured by the classifications of “primary” and “subsidiary.” To
illustrate this point, Judge Weinstein dissented in Kieselstein-Cord
arguing that the majority opinion’s decision marked a distinct shift
from prior developments in the law.150 Judge Weinstein argued:
[C]ourts . . . have tried to follow the principle of the
[C]opyright [A]ct permitting copyright to extend
only to ornamental or superfluous designs contained
within useful objects while denying it to artistically
designed functional components of useful objects.
Generally they have favored representational art as
opposed to non-representation artistic forms which
are embodied in, and part of the structure of, a useful article.151
The concerns associated with the primary-subsidiary approach
were further addressed in the dissenting opinion of Carol Barnhart.152 Judge Newman, in his dissenting opinion, claimed that the
primary-subsidiary approach “does not focus on frequency of utilitarian and non-utilitarian usage since the belt buckles in [the Kieselstein-Cord] case were frequently used to fasten belts and less of-

149

See infra Part III.
See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1980)
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ten used as pieces of ornamental jewelry displayed at various locations other than the waist.”153
Additionally, the design-process approach exemplifies another
ineffective conceptual separability test. For instance, in Brandir,
the Second Circuit argued that Denicola’s design-process approach
was not difficult to administer in practice.154 However, the inability
to practically apply this approach is exactly where the designprocess approach fails. The Second Circuit claimed that the “work
itself will continue to give ‘mute testimony’ of its origins” and that
parties will be required to provide evidence relating to their design
process and the nature of their work.155 However, this approach,
which relies on the designer’s personal artistic judgment, seems
near impossible, if not at the very least counterintuitive, to allow
for a comprehensive, unbiased analysis of the work.
Furthermore, Judge Kanne, in his dissenting opinion in Pivot
Point, was of a similar position regarding the design-process approach. Judge Kanne argued that the majority opinion in Pivot Point
bore little resemblance to the copyright statute.156 Further, he
claimed that the “copyright statute is concerned with protecting
only non-utilitarian features of the useful article.”157
Finally, the likelihood-of-marketability approach has been heavily criticized for its impractical application. Even the Fifth Circuit
in Galiano was aware of the pitfalls involved when applying the likelihood-of-marketability approach.158 For example, the approach
“might unduly favor more conventional forms of art” over modern
ideas.159 Another problem with this “market” approach is that it
runs the risk of restricting copyright protection to only those articles that the market demands.160 This is a hazard that even Nim153
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mer has acknowledged.161 Copyright restriction is at issue because
there is likely a much wider range of people who would consider a
sculpted form a piece of art, than there are people who are actually
capable or willing to purchase the sculpted forms.162
The Fifth Circuit attempted to reason that these issues were
trade-offs it was willing to make in order to have a determinative
rule,163 but this is a significant concern in the area of copyright. The
court’s defense that its single-subject test aligns with other singlesubject tests is inaccurate. To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit gives the
example of an allegedly different test for the protection of maps.164
Yet, “[m]aps are not subject to the separability test, and in fact, the
Fifth Circuit does not apply a different standard for protection for
maps than for any other work.”165 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
claimed their approach was less problematic because it applied only
to one art form.166 However, this singular approach may only lead
to a plethora of tests for different types of applied art, inevitably
creating even more confusion.
C. The Need for One Uniform Application of Conceptual Separability
Not only are several of the existing conceptual separability tests
inadequate in their own capacity, but courts’ application of multiple tests has also lead to paradoxical results. The question has
been presented: “[I]f all roads lead to Rome, then why restrict the
conceptual separability inquiry to one test?”167 In other words,
what is the need for one conceptual separability test if the existing
conceptual separability tests eventually provide for the same result? The answer is simple: the choice of which test to apply is outcome determinative.168 As Star Athletica addressed in its petition
for certiorari, one test may result in granting copyright protection

161

1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 119.
See Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
163
See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421.
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to a PGS work, while another test may not.169 Thus, there is a very
apparent need to reexamine and harmonize the way in which we
analyze conceptual separability.
There is room for debate as to whether there are in fact ten distinct tests.170 However, regardless of an exact number, the use of
more than one test has already created conflict among the courts.171
Furthermore, as each decision in this area develops, it is likely that
courts and scholars will continue to articulate additional tests. This
is evidenced by the tendency of dissenting judges to propose a different test than what the majority adopts.172 Ultimately, a major
concern that underlines the current state of conceptual separability
is the fact that the numerous existing conceptual separability tests
have created unreliable results in copyright law.
To illustrate this issue, Star Athletica addressed two cases relevant to the discussion of conceptual separability in the context of
apparel.173 First, Star Athletica discussed Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., in which the Fifth Circuit considered whether a casino
was prevented from making actual uniforms based on copyrighted
two-dimensional sketches of the uniform.174 The Fifth Circuit used
the likelihood-of-marketability approach, which draws from the
language of Nimmer on Copyright,175 and limited its application to
169
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garment designs only.176 Applying this approach to casino uniforms, the Fifth Circuit held that the buttons, pleats, and collars of
the uniform were not separable because the designs were not
“marketable independently of their utilitarian function as casino
uniforms.”177
In its petition for certiorari, Star Athletica claimed that Varsity’s designs would fail the likelihood-of-marketability test because
“Varsity’s cheerleading-uniform designs are not marketable apart
from their utilitarian function as cheerleading uniforms.”178 However, this conclusion is incorrect. To the contrary, Varsity’s copyrighted stripes, chevrons, and zigzags could be incorporated onto
the surface of a number of articles, such as warm-ups and gym
bags, and therefore the two-dimensional designs are marketable for
purposes other than that of the uniform itself.179
Star Athletica next addressed Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, in which the Second Circuit determined whether the sequins, crystals, satin ruching, and tulle of the designer’s prom dress
were eligible for copyright protection.180 The court applied the design-process approach, finding that the decorative elements of the
prom dress enhanced the clothing’s decorative function.181 The
Second Circuit agreed with the district court, which described the
function of the prom dress as “a garment specifically meant to cover the body in an attractive way for a special occasion.”182 The
Second Circuit concluded that the designer’s prom dress was not
eligible for copyright protection because the aesthetic aspects of
the dress were inseparable from the functional aspects.183 Important to note for this case in particular, however, is that the way in
which the functionality of the prom dress was defined ultimately
determined the outcome of the case.184
176

See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421.
Id. at 421–22.
178
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 28.
179
See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 491 (6th Cir. 2015),
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016).
180
See 500 F. App’x 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2012).
181
See id. at 45.
182
Id. at 44.
183
See id. at 45.
184
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
177

2016]

NEED FOR “SUPREME” CLARITY

169

The district court in Varsity Brands also applied the designprocess approach and held that “[a]rtistic judgment and design are
undeniably important in this context, but they are not separable
from the utilitarian function of the resulting garment.”185 Judge
Cleland further stated that the utilitarian function of a cheerleading
uniform is to “clothe the body in a way that evokes the concept of
cheerleading.”186 As a result of the district court considering the
function of cheerleading uniforms as identifying the wearer as a
cheerleader and enhancing the wearer’s attractiveness, the district
court viewed the decorative elements of cheerleading uniforms as
intrinsically linked to, and thus inseparable from, the utilitarian aspects.187
Applying a different conceptual separability approach, the
Sixth Circuit analyzed the very same set of facts as the district
court, and yet came to a different conclusion in Varsity Brands. In
particular, under the third question of the Sixth Circuit’s hybrid
test, the Sixth Circuit defined the function of a cheerleading uniform namely to “cover the body, wick away moisture, and withstand the rigors of athletic movements.”188 Thus, by using a different definition of a garment’s functionality, the Sixth Circuit found
that the stripes, chevrons, and zigzags were in fact conceptually
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniform.189
Galiano, Jovani, and Varsity Brands are just a few examples of
how the choice of which conceptual separability test to apply entirely affects the outcome of a case. As to be expected with a multitude of tests, there is a mounting frustration among courts regarding the inconsistency within this area of the law.190 The dissenting
185
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opinion in Varsity Brands underscores this point; Judge McKeague
explained, “the law in this area is a mess—and it has been for a
long time.”191 Without the Supreme Court’s determination to have
one conceptual separability test, it is very likely that courts and
scholars will continue to devise new approaches. The accumulation
of conceptual separability inquiries will only congest the already
overcrowded and confusing area of copyright law.
Furthermore, in the face of this growing inconsistency among
copyright law, artists and creators will be deterred from generating
new works of art, which in turn will stifle creativity and innovation.192 To illustrate, there is a new generation of consumers that
are considered a part of the “makers movement.”193 Potentially a
result of economic shifts, activities such as crafting, “do-ityourself” projects, and three-dimensional printing are increasingly
prevalent.194 However, without the proper guidance in copyright
law, the mounting uncertainty regarding conceptual separability
will further burden not only fashion designers, but also the growing
industry of so-called makers who will be unsure as to how to protect their works.
Ultimately, the clash between innovation and lack of protection
“disrupts the balance of copyright law.”195 In an effort to protect
themselves given this uncertainty, creators tend to make the understandable choice of over-assuming copyright protection by asserting overly broad copyright claims.196 This tendency effectively
muddles the distinction between copyrightable and noncopyrightable works, which in turn thwarts creativity and innova-
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tion.197 “Ambiguity pushes the scope of copyright protection outward,” which unjustifiably stifles expression: either designers are
inhibited from creating without interferences, or copyright holders
are incapable of exercising their rights under conflicting rules for
conceptual separability.198 In the end, the public is deprived of
access to creativity.199
III.

RESOLVING THE MOST VEXING PROBLEM IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
Since the 1976 Act, there has been no guidance by the Supreme
Court regarding conceptual separability. In fact, the last time the
Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of conceptual separability
was over sixty years ago in Mazer v. Stein.200 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s decision to hear Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, and hopefully provide clarity on conceptual separability, comes at an imperative time. Accordingly, Section A proposes a new single conceptual separability test for the Supreme Court to adopt. Section B addresses the advantages of this proposed test and why it will allow
for an effective application of conceptual separability moving forward.
A. The Proposed Test for Conceptual Separability
In essence, this Note’s proposed test for conceptual separability is a two-part inquiry which draws upon the language of the Copyright Office and refines the Sixth Circuit’s “hybrid” approach
articulated in Varsity Brands.201 Specifically, the proposed conceptual separability test asks: (1) what are the claimed design elements
of the article; and (2) can those design elements be identified separately from, and exist independently of, the utilitarian features of
the article?
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201
See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015),
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This Note’s proposed test begins its conceptual separability
analysis with an identification of the claimed design elements. By
placing the design elements at the forefront of the inquiry, as opposed to an article’s utilitarian features, a court’s analysis follows
the statutory language and the constitutional foundation of the
Copyright Act.202 Under section 102(a)(5), copyright protection
exists in PGS works, which section 101 defines as “works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”203 The statute first focuses on the
design, before articulating any useful features of the work.204 Thus,
the claimed design is at the crux of the conceptual separability inquiry; the fact finder should always ask “is the claimed design protectable?”205 Indeed, it is only the creative or expressive features of
an article that render the article original and therefore entitled to
copyright protection in the first place.206
Once the article’s design elements are accurately identified, the
fact finder is better situated to analyze the aesthetic features and
utilitarian article “side by side.”207 This leads the conceptual separability inquiry to the second question of the proposed test: whether the claimed design elements can be “identified separately from”
and “exist independently of” the utilitarian aspects of the article.208 Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s hybrid approach which makes
two distinct inquiries on “separate identification” and “independent existence,” this question is posed as a single inquiry.209 As an
202
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integrated inquiry, the test properly interprets the statutory
framework set out in the Copyright Act and allows for a simple and
practical application of the separability analysis.210
In order for a PGS work to be copyrightable, the aesthetic features of the article should not enhance the article’s utilitarian functionality, but rather invoke in the viewer a concept that is separate
from that of the article’s utilitarian function.211 Thus, the PGS features are conceptually separable if the artistic features and the useful article are “perceived as fully realized, separate works—one an
artistic work and the other a useful article.”212 Courts should analyze separability of the article’s features in the eyes of an ordinary,
reasonable observer. An ordinary, reasonable observer avoids the
criticism directed toward Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion in
Carol Barnhart.213 Unlike Judge Newman’s approach, which requires “a complete temporal displacement of the utilitarian function by the aesthetic features,” under this proposed test, the ordinary, reasonable observer who simultaneously perceives the article’s
aesthetic features with its utilitarian function, still satisfies the conceptual separability.214 The ordinary, reasonable observer is a hypothetical character and thus, the fact finder deciding the case should
also use as guidance the objective indicia of the public perception
(such as whether the article is displayed in museums or is otherwise presented for public viewing)215, and whether the article has
an alternative use as a work of art apart from its utilitarian function
(such as whether the article is displayed as a piece of art in an entirely nonfunctional manner).216

22, 2016) (quoting Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 922
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Included in the second part of this inquiry is whether the PGS
features of the article can exist independently of its utilitarian aspects. This inquiry relies on the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Varsity
Brands and ultimately draws from the objectively necessary approach.217 Essentially, this part of the proposed test asks whether
the aesthetic features of the PGS work are “wholly unnecessary to
the performance of”218 the article’s utilitarian function. Two factors to consider when determining the necessity of the aesthetic
features include, whether the artistic features are transferable or
capable of existing on other articles, and whether the artistic features are interchangeable.219 To illustrate, in Varsity Brands, the
Sixth Circuit held that Varsity’s two-dimensional designs may be
incorporated on the surface of different types of garments, including shirts and practice wear.220 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held
that the ability of those designs to be arranged on the cheerleading
uniforms in multiple ways was evidence that the graphic designs on
the surface of the uniform did not affect its actual function.221 In
fact, “nothing (save perhaps good taste) prevents” Varsity from
printing its designs, framing them, and hanging the prints on the
wall as art.222 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Varsity’s
designs were “wholly unnecessary to the performance of” the
garment’s ability to cover the body, permit free movement, and
wick away moisture.223
B. Advantages of the Proposed Test
This Note’s proposed two-part analysis for determining conceptual separability is an effective test because it achieves the goals
of the copyright regime and clarifies a much-needed area of copyright law. The Supreme Court should adopt this Note’s two-part
test as the appropriate approach for determining when a feature of
217
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a useful article is protectable under the Copyright Act because: (1)
focusing the conceptual separability inquiry on the article’s design
elements as opposed to its utilitarian features avoids inconsistent
results; (2) the two-part inquiry draws from language of the Copyright Office, which in turn reflects agreement between the legislative and judicial branches; (3) the ordinary, reasonable observer
standard is consistent with other aspects of copyright law; and (4)
this Note’s proposed test is practical in its application.
1. An Initial Consideration of Design Rather than Utility
Avoids Inconsistent Results
First, the proposed test refines the analysis of separability by
focusing initially on the determination of an article’s design elements.224 In comparison, existing conceptual separability tests have
created conflicts among courts and scholars,225 with many of these
disputes a result of variable definitions of an article’s utilitarian
function. For example, some believe that the inquiry of functionality is “particularly fraught in the case of clothing, whose function is
so intimately linked with its aesthetic appeal that some courts have
applied a presumption that anything adding to that appeal is not
entitled to copyright protection.”226 Whether or not this is the case
here, the mounting inconsistencies and inefficiencies among court
decisions is a result of focusing the conceptual separability analysis
on an article’s function. Thus, beginning the inquiry with the identification of design elements, as opposed to concentrating on utilitarian features, allows the fact finder to avoid such inconsistent results.
Some have argued that analyzing an article’s design elements
opens the door for criticism directed toward judges that may make
aesthetic judgments, which are outside the scope of their expertise.227 However, this proposed test avoids this potential for con224
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cern because the proposed test does not ask the fact finder to analyze the quality or degree of the design elements but rather simply
identify the claimed design. This identification process would be
no different than applying the same language of the Copyright Act
to determine if a “work of craftsmanship” meets the requirements
of originality and fixed medium.228 Unlike other conceptual separability tests, which require extrinsic facts for their analysis, courts
can apply the same methodology as Copyright Office personnel
when they evaluate copyright applications—i.e., on the basis of the
application and deposit material alone.229
2. The Proposed Test Uses Language of the Copyright Office,
Which Is Consistent with the Legislative and Judicial
Branches
This Note’s proposed test draws from the language of the
Copyright Office, which is consistent with both the Copyright Act
and case law precedent. The proposed test therefore already reflects the judgment of the legislative and judicial branches. Consistency in language is no mistake—the language of the Copyright Office and the Copyright Act trace its roots back to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mazer.230 It was the Supreme Court’s decision
that introduced the notion of conceptual separability; the regulations of the Copyright Office were immediately amended to accommodate the Court’s holding in Mazer; and the copyright statute now reflects the same language.231 Therefore, this Note’s proposed two-part test allows for an organic and interdependent application of a conceptual separability standard.
Furthermore, using the Copyright Office’s very own language
will avoid the potential of providing determinations inconsistent
with copyright experts. Specialists in the Copyright Office analyze
and assist in the drafting of copyright legislation, and thus the Copthemselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”).
228
See supra Section I.C.
229
See Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae
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yright Office’s opinion provides for a knowledgeable and qualified
analysis of conceptual separability.232 As such, Congress seriously
considers the advice of the Copyright Office when codifying regulations,233 so it is beneficial for courts to respect the opinions of the
Copyright Office.
3. The Ordinary, Reasonable Observer Standard Is Consistent
with Other Areas of Copyright Law
This Note’s proposed test is advantageous because the ordinary, reasonable observer standard is consistent with other aspects
of copyright law. For example, copyright law uses the ordinary,
reasonable observer standard to decide similar conceptual issues of
copyright law, including whether an allegedly infringing work is
“substantially similar” to an allegedly infringed copyrighted
work.234 Consistency breeds uniformity, which in turn encourages
reliability: If courts uniformly apply copyright standards, society
may rely on an efficient and predictable court system. Thus, this
proposed test allows for a uniform and reliable application of a conceptual separability standard.
4. The Proposed Test Is Practical in Its Application
This Note’s proposed two-part test will be applicable not only
to Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, but also other conceptual separability cases moving forward. To illustrate its application, in the
case before us, the Supreme Court would first determine the design elements of the cheerleading uniforms. The design elements
are the two-dimensional graphic designs which are affixed to the
uniforms—i.e., the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking. Although
protection and originality of these design elements is not a question
currently before the Court, for purposes of this illustration, assume
the design elements of Varsity’s uniforms meet the requirements
of copyrightability.235
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Next, the court moves to the second question of the proposed
test: Can the graphic designs be “identified separately” and “exist
independently” from the utilitarian aspects of the uniform? The
Supreme Court, from the perspective of an ordinary, reasonable
observer, could identify the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking
separate from the utilitarian aspects of the uniform and also find
that the graphic designs did not enhance the uniforms’ functionality as clothing. To illustrate this identification, the Sixth Circuit
noted that “a plain white cheerleading top and plain white skirt still
cover the body and permit the wearer to cheer, jump, kick, and
flip.”236 To complete its analysis, the Supreme Court would determine whether Varsity’s designs “exist independently” of the
utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniform. As the Sixth Circuit
explained, it could envision Varsity “printing or painting its designs, framing them, and hanging the resulting prints on the wall as
art.”237 Thus, consistent with this analysis and drawing from the
language of the Copyright Office, the Supreme Court can conclude
that “a graphic design and a blank cheerleading uniform can appear
‘side by side’—one as a graphic design, and one as a cheerleading
uniform.”238
To promote longevity of application and provide for overall effective copyright law, the Supreme Court should consider a single
conceptual separability test that may be practically applied by future courts to a variety of PGS works. To exemplify this proposed
test’s application to other useful articles, consider a wearable technology that is designed as a bracelet but functions primarily as a
step-counting device. If a court starts by identifying the design of
the wearable technology, it should be clear that the design of the
bracelet is entirely separable from the step-counting feature. In
other words, there is no need to delve into the bracelet’s utility to
identify the bracelet’s design. In contrast, if the court uses the
Sixth Circuit’s hybrid approach (or any other conceptual separability test that focuses its initial analysis on the article’s utilitarian features), it would interrupt the inquiry by attempting to determine
the utilitarian purpose of the device, which could very well include
236
237
238
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a number of functional qualities.239 The court might therefore conclude that, to serve its purpose, the wearable technology must be a
certain shape or size, and would thus mistakenly conclude the design is uncopyrightable. Therefore, to avoid such a result, and to
allow for a uniform and practical application of the conceptual separability standard moving forward, the Supreme Court should
adopt this Note’s two-part inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Distinguishing between copyrightable aesthetic features of a
PGS work, and the non-protectable utilitarian aspects of an article,
has proven to be an uncertain and effectively metaphysical task.240
Over the years, circuit courts and scholars have approached conceptual separability in a multitude of ways, without proper guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress. The result is as many
as ten existing conceptual separability tests which, when taken together, have made copyright protection of useful articles an exceedingly unreliable and inconsistent area of copyright law. In today’s
economy, garments, among other useful articles, continue to blur
the boundaries between aesthetic and functional concerns. Given
this reality, the current state of conceptual separability demands
clarity and reform, which the Supreme Court can finally provide in
its decision of Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands. Thus, this Note proposes a two-part test, which tailors the separability analysis to an
article’s design elements, refers to an ordinary, reasonable observer, and derives from the language of the Copyright Office, to provide for a clearer and simplified application of conceptual separability under copyright law.
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